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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM ( ~~ ~) 
February 19, 1982 Conference 
List 5, Sheet 3 
No. 81-1120-CFX 
6( c_ UNITED STATES e 
v. 
Cert to CA9 (Wallace, Fletcher; 
Norris, concurring) 
RYLANDER,@ Federal/Civil Timely (w/ext.) 
1. SUMMARY: The SG asks the Court to ? nt this petn and 
consolidate it (or set it in tandem) with No. 8 1-1063 United 
States v. Meeks [February 19, 1982 Conference, List 7, Sheet 2] 
on the following question: whether a party who has failed to 
produce records pursuant to a court order enforcing a summons may 
~ 
carry his burden of production in the subsequent contempt 
proceeding by denying possession of the records, then relying on 
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his Fifth Amendment privilege against s dlf-incrimination to 
defeat further inquiry. 
2. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS BELOW: The IRS conducted a civil 
investigation of resp's tax liabilities for the years 1973-1976. 
In January, 1979, the IRS issued summonses to resp in his 
capacity as president of two companies, seeking testimony and 
✓ . 
production of corporate books and records. Resp failed to comply. 
Petrs then petned in ED Cal for enforcement of the summonses 
under 26 U.S.C. §§7402 (b), 7604 (a). 
Resp did not appear at the enforcement proceeding. In 
response to the order to show cause, resp submitted an unsworn 
written declaration that he was not the president of the subject 
corporations and therefore had been served improperly. Petrs then 
made offers of proof showing that resp was the president of the 
subject corporations. On January, 19 80, the DC (Kar 1 ton) issued 
an order enforcing the summonses and ordering resp to appear 
before the IRS with the requested records and documents. For the 
first time, resp appeared, but claimed that he had none of the 
records called for by the summons. 
Petrs successfully petned for orders to show cause why resp 
should not be held in contempt. Although attempts at personal 
service failed, the DC determined that constructive service had 
been accomplished, and that petr was avoiding personal service. 
The DC issued a bench warrant, which led to resp's arrest in July 
1980. The DC found that resp was in civil contempt because he had 
failed to comply with a valid court order. The DC ordered resp 
into the custody of the attorney general until he purged himself 
• 
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of the contempt, either by complying with the production order or 
testifying why he could not produce the records. 
Resp then submitted a sworn statement that he did not have 
any of the records. A hearing was held, where resp took the 
stand and so testified; when asked where the records were, 
however, he declined to answer on Fifth Amendment grounds. He was 
again held in contempt and his incarceration suspended pending 
appeal. 
3. DECISION BELOW: The CA9 reversed and remanded. Judge 
Fletcher, writing for the panel, first rejected the government's 
claim that resp's failure to appear at the enforcement proceeding 
estopped him from claiming at the later contempt proceeding that 
he was unable to produce the requested records. The enforcement 
proceeding was a summary action at which the question of resp's 
ability to comply was not actually litigated; nor did the DC make 
an express finding that resp in fact was able to comply with the 
summons. Thus, res judicata did not bar resp from later raising 
the defense of inability to comply at the contempt proceeding. 
The CA then specified the allocation of burdens of 
production and persuasion at the civil contempt proceeding. 
Under NLRB v. Trans Ocean Export Packing, Inc., 473 F.2d 612, 616 
(CA9 1973), a deft's failure to comply with a valid court order 
ordinarily places a burden of production on the deft to show 
"categorically and in detail" why he is unable to comply. The CA 
held, however, that "when the defendant has made a bona fide 
fifth amendment claim, his statement that the documents are not 
• 
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in his possession or under his control is sufficient to satisfy 
his burden of production." Pet. App. 10a. 
The CA then remanded to the DC for a finding on the question 
whether resp's Fifth Amendment claim was in fact bona fide. If 
it was, the CA held, resp's sworn denial of possession coupled 
with his Fifth Amendment claim would satisfy his burden of 
production; the government would then have the burden of 
producing evidence showing that the documents in question 
actually existed and were in the defendant's possession or under 
his control. 1 
Judge Norris, concurring separately, argued that the 
majority unnecessarily dee ided the Fifth Amendment issue. By 
itself, resp's sworn statement denying possession of the 
requested records was sufficiently detailed to satisfy his burden 
of production on the issue of his inability to comply with the 
summons. Thus, Judge Norris argued that the case should be 
remanded so that the government might carry its burden of proving 
that resp had the ability to produce the records. 
4. CONTENTIONS: The SG argues that the CA9's decision in ----
this case, together with the CAS's decision in United States v. 
Meeks, [February 19, 1982 Conference, List 7, Sheet 2] provides 
"a ~ " for evasion of IRS enforcement proceedings. The two 
decisions, while slightly different in their facts and 
rationales, both involve situations where a corpo~ ate official, 
called upon to produce corporate books and records, initially 
1The CA further stated that "[a]lthough relevant, 
inferences that the records sought are of a type ordinarily kept 
by corporations, and that a person in the defendant's position 
would ordinarily have control over such records are not adequate 
to meet the government's burden of proof." Pet. App. 10a. 
• 
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resists production of those records on grounds other than his 
inability to comply. Here, resp alleged that he was not 
president of the corporation; in Meeks, resp hinted that he was 
able to comply, but sought transactional immunity. After a final 
appealable order compelling production, both Rylander and Meeks 
were directed to show cause why they should not be held in 
contempt. Both then asserted for the first time in a written -submission that they could not produce any of the records, and 
that any further statement might incriminate them. 
The SG then raises specific challenges to the CA's rulings 
6) ~C2)'1----- --- ~ 
on three issues: estqppel, the burdens of proof in a civil 
contempt proceeding, a{Pwaiver of Fifth Amendment privilege. 
The SG notes first that resp's failure to appear and adduce 
proof at the enforcement proceeding that he was unable to comply 
with the summons led to entry of a final, appealable enforcement 
order against him. Res judicata therefore barred him from 
litigating at the subsequent contempt proceeding the question 
whether he possessed or controlled the summoned records at the 
time of the enforcement order. By holding that resp was not 
foreclosed from raising the "inability to comply" defense at the 
contempt proceeding, the CA's decision conflicts with this 
Court's decision in Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 75-76 {1948), 
and the decisions of the CA2 and the CA6 in United States v. 
Secor, 476 F.2d 766 {CA2 1973) and United States v. Peter, 479 
F.2d 147 {CA6 1973). The CA's holding on this point also ignored 
the DC's order enforcing the summons -- an implicit determination 
that resp had the records sought -- and the presumption that a 
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corporate officer has a continuing ability to produce corporate 
books and records. See Lopiparo v. United States, 216 F.2d 87, 91 
(CAB 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 916 (1955). 
~ the CA improperly carved out a "Fifth Amendment" 
exception to established rules regarding burdens of proof at 
contempt proceedings. When an alleged contemnor fails to comply 
with a court order, the burden shifts to him to prove by clear 
and convincing proof why he should not be held in contempt. The 
contemnor should not be able to carry that burden by a self-
serving uncross-examined statement that he does not have the 
requested records, coupled with assertion of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege. The CA's ruling on this point conflicts with McPhaul 
v. United States, 364 U.S.372 (1960), and decisions by the CA2, 
CA5, and CAB. See United States v. Johnson, 247 F.2d 5 (CA2 
1957): United States v. Hankins, 565 F.2d 1344 (CA5 1978), cert. 
denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979): Lopiparo v. United States, 216 F.2d 
8 7 , 91 ( CA 8 19 5 4 ) , c er t • den i e d , 3 4 8 u • s • 916 ( 19 5 5 ) ( a 11 
suggesting that contemnor may not meet his burden of proof at 
contempt proceeding by denial of possession coupled with 
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege). By also requiring 
the government to make an affirmative showing at the contempt 
hearing that resp had possession and control of the corporate 
records, the CA9 imposed an obligation on the government which 
conflicts with the burdens of proof specified in United States v. 
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950) and United States v. Fleischman, 339 
U.S. 349 (1950). 
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~ the SG argues that the CA should not have accepted 
resp s uncross-examined statement that he could not produce the 
records as credible evidence establishing his inability to 
comply. Since the CA found that this statement was competent 
evidence, it should also have found that resp had waived his 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On this 
point, the SG claims, the CA's holding conflicts with the CAS's 
decision in United States v. Hankins, supra (holding that a 
statement by a contemnor that he could not comply with a summons 
is not credible evidence unless it is cross-examined). 
The SG concludes by arguing that the CA's decision hampers 
the IRS's ability to collect the information necessary to assess 
tax liabilities. A recipient of a summons can refuse to produce -records, raise specious defenses, then deny possession of records 
and assert the Fifth Amendment privilege and thereby gain 
immunity from contempt, all the while knowing that the statute of 
limitations is running. 
5. DISCUSSION: The question presented seems substantial. 
The SG persuasively argues that the CA' s decision will have 
serious practical consequences, allowing recipients of IRS 
summonses to withhold information indefinitely with hopes of 
delaying an investigation until the applicable statute of 
limitations runs out. The CA's res judicata holding allows defts 
to withhold some defenses, such as inability to comply, until 
after an enforcement order has been entered and affirmed on 
appeal, and then to raise such defenses at the subsequent 
contempt proceeding. Furthermore, under the CA's analysis, if 
- -- 8 -
the deft submits an uncross-examined statement denying that he 
ever possessed the documents and asserts the Fifth Amendment 
privilege to avoid testimonial cross-examination, he will have 
satisfied his burden of production. The burden of proving that 
resp is in contempt would then shift to the government, which 
would have to prove that resp was in possession of the recorCs a,d 
therefore able to comply with the enforcement order. The 
government may find that burden difficult to carry, especially 
since the facts that the government must prove are peculiarly 
within deft's knowledge. See note 1, supra. 
The SG suggests three possible grounds upon which the Court could 
reverse. First, the Court could hold that resp must raise and 
--------1 it i gate all defenses, such as inability to comply, at the 
enforcement proceeding or be estopped from raising those defenses 
,, 
at the contempt proceeding by res judicata. Second, it could 
hold that an uncross-examined statement denying possession of 
requested records, coupled with an assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege, is not enough to carry a contemnor's burden 
of production on the issue of inability to comply. Third, it 
could hold that admission of the uncross-examined statement into 
evidence constitutes waiver of resp's Fifth Amendment privilege -·. 
against self-incrimination. 
These three issues are presented more clearly by this petn 
than by the petn in No. 81-1063 United States v. Meeks. Thus, if 
the Court wishes to grant only one of these petns, while holding 
the other, this case seems to me a better candidate for plenary 
review than Meeks. On the other hand, I see no reason not to 
'- - -
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grant and consolidate the two petns and hear them together for 
one hour. Consideration of the different factual settings of the 
two cases might help the Court in formulating a coherent rule to 
govern the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination in the context of civil contempt proceedings. 
6. RECOMMENDATION: Justice Stevens has already called for 
a response in this case. I recommend that the petn be granted, 
and the case consolidated for argument with No. 81-1063 United 
States v. Meeks. 
02/11/82 Koh Opns in petn 
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Motion of Respondents for 
Ap:EX)intrnent of Counsel 
SUMMARY: On April 26, 1982, the Court granted cert to the CA 9 and also 
granted ifp status to resp. His counsel, Mr. Joseph F. Harbison, III, now 
requests to be app::>inted as resp•sl counsel for oral argument. 
FACTS AND CCNI'ENI'IONS: Resp's case initially arose from enforcement of 
an IRS subpoena in the DC (ED Calif.). r-t:>vant was ap:EX)inted by that court to 
represent resp and he later perfected resp's appeal to the CA 9. Cert was 
granted to that court on April 26. 
Movant states that through handling resp's case he has prepared five 
separate appellate briefs (including the brief in op:EX)sition), and has 
presented oral argument. To date he estimates that he has spent approximately 
300 hours in research, writing, and oral argument. He is currently scheduled 
to serve as 
!Representation would apparently exterrl only to Mr. Rylander arrl not his 
corporation. 




· \ - - 2 - -
resp's defense counsel in an upcoming federal criminal trial. Movant is 
agraduate of the McGeorge School of Law. He does not state whether he is a 
member of this Court's Bar2 but he does :fX)int out that he has argued on 
numerous occasions before the CA g ·on both civil and criminal matters. 
DISCUSSION: Although movant does not indicate that the resp (Mr. 
Rylander) wishes to be represented by him, it seems 1 safe to conclude that resp 
•. 
would join in the request--movant is now serving as his defense counsel in a 
pending criminal trial. In view of movant's extensive involvement, his motion 
to be ap:fX)inted as counsel should be granted. 




2The Clerk's Office advises that movant was admitted to this 
Court's Bar on March 1, 1982. 
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Michael F. Sturley 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
No. 81-1120 
United States v. Rylander 
Questions Presented 
January 16, 1983 
(1) What burden may be placed on the respondent in a 
civil contempt proceeding consistent with his claim of Fifth 
Amendment privilege? 
(2) If the burden is on respondent to establish his 
inability to comply with a court order, may he sustain this bur-
den by {i) submitting a sworn statement that he is unable to com-
ply, and {ii} refusing to explain further on the ground that an 
explanation would tend to incriminate him? 
bench memo: United states v. Ryianaer 
-
Outline of Memorandum 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
B. Facts 
C. Decision Below 
II. Discussion 
A. The Res Judicata Claim 
B. The Fifth Amendment Problem 
(1) The CA9 Views. 
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bench memo: United states v. Ryianaer page L.. 
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I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
Under 26 u.s.c. §§7402(b) and 7604(a), a DC has juris-
diction "by appropriate process" to compel a person to produce 




Resp Richard W. Rylander, Sr., yr- the president of two 
companies: Rylander & Co. Realtors, Inc., and Affiliated Invest-
ments & Mortgage Co. As part of an investigation into the compa-
nies' tax liabilities, the IRS issued summonses to resp on Janu-
ary 4, 1979, that required him to testify and to produce certain 
corporate records. When resp refused, the IRS petitioned the DC 
(ED Cal 1 Karl ton) for enforcement of the summonses under 26 
u.s.c. §§7402(b) and 7604(a). Between August and November, the 
DC issued four sets of orders to show cause why the summonses _______________________.. 
should not be enforced. Service was finally effected in Novem-
ber, and a hearing was scheduled for January 14, 1980. Resp did 
not appear at this hearing, but returned the orders to the DC 
with a letter denying that he was the president of the companies. 
The DC nevertheless held the hearing. It concluded that resp was 
~AA)y ,)=.h~ president a~ orced 
~ ,./' t~•~ ~ -p 
summonses. Resp did not appeal -----
ir-- On February 4, 1980, 
frl-
resp appeared before an IRS agent 
and stated that he did not possess the corporate records he was 
required to produce. He refused to answer further questions. 
bench memo: United States v. Rylander page .:S. 
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The IRS then petitioned the DC for enforcement of its order and 
the DC directed resp to show cause why he should not be held in 
contempt. On October 8, the DC held a show cause hearing and 
resp offered no evidence. The DC accordingly found him guilty 
civil contempt and ordered him imprisoned 
unless and until he purges himself of the civil con-
tempt charge by either: (1) Complying with the Court 
Order to produce the documents; or (2) Testifies [sic] 
why he cannot produce the documents. 
Petn app 3a-4a. When resp indicated he would testify, the DC 
adjourned the hearing. On October 9, in an attempt to purge him-
self, resp submitted a sworn statement entitled "Oath in Purga-
t ion of Contempt and Release of Records." 
clared, in part: 
This statement de-
I swear on oath that I have no such records as called 
for in the Court's order of January 16, 198 0 . . • . I 
further swear on oath that I know not the location of 
any such records, if any there be, or that any such 
record if any there be, are in anyway under my control 
or supervision or that I have in anyway placed any such 
records, if any there be, in the hands of any other 
person to hold for me. I further swear on oath that I 
have no intent plan or purpose to withhold any such 
records, if any there be, from the Court as called for 
in the Court's order of January 16, 1980, and I hereby 
release any such records, if any there be, which anyone 
may in anyway deem to require my release to this court. 
J .A. 91-92. the DC reconvened the hearing. Resp ---took not have any of the ~------------------------------_, 
records called for the IRS summons. Asserting his Fifth 
Amendment privilege, declined to answer any further questions. 
The DC reinstated its ctober 8 contempt order. 
• 
bench memo: Unitect states v. RyLancter page 4. 
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C. Decision Below 
On appeal, CA9 (Wallace, Fletcher; Norris concurring) 
reversed and remanded. The majority noted that the inability to 
comply with a court order is a complete defense to a "compulsory" 
civil contempt charge, such as the one at issue here. The prin-
cipal questions were: (i) which party has the burden of proof, 
and (ii) whether that burden has been met. 
The majority first rejected the Government's contention 
that resp was barred by principles of res judicata from asserting 
that he did not have the documents in question. The January 1980 
hearing, and the resulting DC order enforcing the summonses, did 
not address this issue. Under United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 
48, 57-58 (1964), the Government was not required to show that 
resp had the documents. The only issues litigated were resp's 
position with the companies, and the applicability of the Powell 
conditions. 
On the burden of proof issue, the majority concluded 
that the initial burden in a case such as this is on the Govern-
which must show that the defendant has failed to comply 
a valid court order. The burden then shifts to the defen-
dant to show why he is unable to comply. This, however, is only 
a burden of production. Once "the defendant produces sufficient 
evidence of his inability to comply to raise a question of fact," 
the Government has the "burden of persuading the court that the 
defendant is actually able to comply." Petn app 8a. The major-
ity concluded that "[w] hen the defendant has made a bona fide 
[F]ifth [A]mendment claim, his statement that the documents are 
bench memo: United States v. Rylander page::>. 
- -
not in his possession or under his control is sufficient to sat-
isfy his burden of production." Id., at 10a. CA9 accordingly 
remanded the case to the DC to determine the validity of resp's 
Fifth Amendment claim. 1 
Judge Norris concurred separately. He accused the ma-
jority of deciding "a novel Fifth Amendment question" unnecessar-
ily, since it was possible to dispose of the case on the basis of 
a nonconsti tutional issue. He concluded that resp' s "detailed 
statement" was "sufficient to put into issue [his] 'inability to 
comply' defense, shifting the burden of going forward back to the 
government." Id., at 12a-13a. Requiring more would run a seri-
ous risk of imprisoning a defendant for his inability to prove a 
negative. 
II. Discussion 
I find this a close and difficult case. The CA9 reason-
ing is probably wrong, so even if the judgment should be af-
firmed, it should be affirmed on different grounds. The key is-
sue is whether the choice offered resp is permissible in light of 
his claimed Fifth Amendment privilege. 
1It is not clear what happened to the SG's usual ripeness argu-
ment. Applying the SG's standard doctrine, this case would not 
j be ripe for review until after the remand, since there is a pos-sibility that the DC will find that resp's Fifth Amendment claim is in val id. Under those circumstances, the Government's cert 
petn would be moot. If the DC upholds resp's Fifth Amendment 
~ 
claim, on the other hand, the Government can appeal at that time. 
Resp is presumably unfamiliar with this argument, since it was 
not raised in his opposition brief. I assume the SG finds it 
less convincing when the Government is the petr. 
bench memo: United States v. Ryiancter page t:>. - - ~~ 
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A. The Res Jud ic a ta Claim ,t.J- · ~ ~ f4""'"'_:,-:;::::;-';;J--
i nced by the SG's res judica~ -
tention. What his ar ,.__m_,e"'--n-t--e_s...,entially comes to is tha~ 
should have raised h's current defense ("I do not have the docu-
contempt stage. While this generally may be a sensible policy, 
resp was not required to raise his defense then. Since the de-
fense was not in fact litigated, and since rejection of the de-
fense was not a necessary element of the DC's enforcement of the 
summonses, resp is not barred from raising the defense now. 2 
The res judicata contention also strikes me as a poor 
strategy for the SG, for if the judgment below is reversed on res 
judicata grounds, the Government will win an empty victory. It 
may succeed in coercing resp, but that hardly seems necessary in 
view of the material it already has against him. Under such a 
\ 
decision, the nex t tax evader will simply know to make his sworn 
disclaimer and Fifth Amenament claim at an earlier stage, and the 
Government will be in little better position to deal with it. 
CA9, at least, would simply cite its earlier decision in this 
case and note that it was "reversed on other grounds." The Gov-
ernment will gain some time in these circumstances, but the un-
derlying problem will remain. ~ ~ ~ 
!J~~~~~~ 
2If the SG's res judicata~o ention w a n seriously, the 
results could be absurd. R p would not be allowed to claim that 
he never had the documents even if he could now prove that asser-
tion. The Government thus could imprison resp until he produces 
the documents despite his provable ~ nability to do so. 
? 
I 
bench memo: United states v. Ryiancter page ,. 
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B. The Fifth Amendment Problem ~
(1) The CA9 Views. I am /convinced by the reasoning of 
either CA9 opinion. Judge Norris;::~:ns of the dangers of forcing 
a defendant to prove a negative, but that is not at issue here. 
The burden on resp was to explain his inability to produce the 
documents. His mere assetion that he does not have the records 
and does not know their location is not enough, however detailed 
that assertion may be. Assuming (as Judge Norris does) that the 
Fifth Amendment is irrelevant, resp is required to offer some 
explanation why he does not have the records and does not know 
their location. If the truth is actually the negative that can-
not be proven, i.e., if resp did not keep such records and never 
knew anything about them, he must explain that fact before the 
burden shifts back to the Government. 
The majority reasoning is also suspect. It basically 
says that resp's sworn statement, which is inadequate standing 
alone, is adequate when coupled with a claim of Fifth Amendment 
privilege. I find this unconvincing, for I do not think that a 
claim of privilege supports resp in meeting his burden. At most 
it prohibits the DC from assuming the worst about potential tes-
timony.3 It does not require the DC to assume the best. In oth-
~ I-£> ~ 4'f 3If resp simply had testified a-eottt his sworn statement and 
refused to be cross-examined, toe DC would have been entitled to 
assume the worst about what the cross-examination would have re-
vealed and strike the testimony. Since resp claimed a Fifth 
Amendment privilege, however, the DC could not assume that the 
testimony he might have given would be bad. Accordingly the 
sworn statement is allowed to stand for what little it is worth 
on its face. ~ 
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er words, the privilege neither adds not detracts from resp' s 
other testimony. Since the testimony with the Fifth Amendment 
claim is no different from the testimony without it, the major-
ity's analysis fails for the same reason that Judge Norris's 
does. There simply is not enough there to overcome the burden 
placed on resp. 
(2) The Propriety of the Burden. The rejection of CA9's 
reasoning does not necessarily mean that the decision below must 
be reversed, for there remains the issue--slightly different from 
that addressed by the -CA9 major i ty--whether the Government is 
entitled to place the burden on resp at all. Resp' s strongest 
argument is that, although it may be permissible to require de-
fendants to establish their inability to comply with court orders 
under normal circumstances, the Fifth Amendment prohibits such 
burdens when a defendant asserts his right not to incriminate 
himself. 
It is well recognized that the Fifth Amendment protects 
individuals from being compelled to give testimony. It is also 
well recognized that an individual is never compelled to give 
testimony in a literal sense, for he always can stand mute and 
brave whatever consequences the Government devises. The true ~-------~-----------------power of the Fifth Amendment, therefore, is in prohibiting the 
Government from improperly requiring individuals to make choices 
when one of those choices is testifying against himself. For 
example, in South Dakota v. Neville, No. 81-1453, I explained in 
my bench memo, at p. 10, that it would be improper for the State 
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to offer Neville a choice between refusing to take a blood alco-
hol test (i.e., testifying against himself) and submitting to a 
test that involved extreme pain or could result in medical com-
plications. But it was acceptable for the State to offer him a 
choice between refusing to take a test and submitting to a safe 
test administered by a nurse, since there was then a reasonable 
choice available. 
Here there are, in theory, four choices available to 
resp: (1) he can turn over the documents to the IRS; (2) he can 
explain why he is unable to produce the documents; (3) he can 
provide nontestimonial evidence or third-party testimony support-
ing his claimed inability; ~ (4) he can remain in jail indefi-
nitely. If all four of these choices (or any three of them) are 
in fact available to resp, there has been no impermissible burden 
placed on him. The problem is that there is a strong possibility 
that only choices (2) and (4) are available. 4 If that is so, 
resp faces the classic "cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perju---
ry, or contempt," Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 51, 
55 (1964), that the Fifth Amendment prohibits. I therefore con-
clude that the Government may not force the choice on resp. When 
resp claimed the right not to incriminate himself, he did not 
meet the burden that had been placed on him (as CA9 concluded), 
but the Fifth Amendment requires that the burden be removed. 
4My personal guess is that r~sp has destroye_d the records at 
issue, thus precluding choice (1. ). Ir he haa sufficient discre-
tion when he destroyed them, there is no independent evidence 
supporting his claimed inability, thus precluding choice (3). 
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(3) Distinctions. This would be a different case if the 
Government could prove that choice (1) or choice (3) is available 
to resp. 5 On remand, for example, the DC could take the IRS's 
evidence and conclude from it that resp has access to the records 
that he is required to produce. Once the DC has properly made 
this factual finding, it would be justified in holding resp in 
contempt. Under those circumstances, resp would not face an im-
permissible choice. 
The Government's strongest argument against the CA9 
judgment is based on the analogy to McGautha v. California, 402 
U.S. 183 (1971}, but the analogy is imperfect. In McGautha, the 
defendants were being punished for the murders that they had com-
mitted rather than for their refusal to testify. A simple hypo-
thetical illustrates this distinction more clearly. Suppose that 
a defendant is charged with assault--an accusation that he could 
disprove on grounds of self defense. Under the governing law, he 
has the burden of proving self defense. In order to plead it, 
however, he must give testimony that incriminates him on some 
more serious charge. He thus faces a choice between being pun-
ished for assault or incriminating himself. Under McGautha, this 
choice is not prohibited by the Fifth Amendment, since the defen-
dant would be punished for the assault rather than for his refus-
al to raise the self defense issue. Resp, in contrast, would be 
5As a practical matter, of course, the Government is unlikely 
to prove that choice (3) is open to resp. If independent evi-
dence exists, the Government will simply rely on it directly. 
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imprisoned under the DC's order precisely because he has refused 
to incriminate himself by explaining his inability to produce the 
records sought by the IRS. 6 That is the entire point of "compul-
sory" (as opposed to "compensatory") civil contempt. 
III. Conclusion 
I find this a difficult case, but conclude that under 
the Fifth Amendment the Government cannot place the burden it h as 7 
on resp unless it can demonstrate that resp has the ability to _________ ..., _________________ _ 
produce the records it seeks. Accordingly, the judgment of CA9 ---------~ 
should be affirmed on different grounds. 
6This would be a different case if these circumstances were 
governed by a strict liability crime based on a custodian's re-
fusal to turn over corporate records. Then the Government could 
punish resp for violating that crime unless he presented an ade-
quate (possibly self-incriminato! y) defense. The difference is 
that resp would be sentenced to a definite term for violating a 
statutory offense rather than an indefinite term for continuing 
to violate a court order. 
- -
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Re: No. 81-1120, United States v. Rylander 
In many situations the Government places a burden on a 
citizen to perform some act. A witness to a crime, for example, 
may be required by subpoena to testify. This effectively means 
that he is given two choices: testifying or being punished for 
contempt. The Government is generally allowed to force this 
choice on the witness because he has a reasonable option--
testifying. If the witness claims a Fifth Amendment privilege, 
however, this is no longer true. What had been a reasonable 
choice becomes, with the assertion of the privilege, an impermis-
sible burden. 
A purported custodian of corporate records generally may 
be required to produce those records or explain why he is unable 
to do so. This effectively means that he is given three choices: 
/if'\....roducing the records~ estifying as to his inability to produce 
LJ_/'1='_ /3) . 
them, or bei r\efpunished for contempt. Even if the purported cus-
todian does not have the records, the Government is still allowed 
to force this choice on him because he has a reasonable option--
explaining why he does not have the records. When the purported 
custodian claims a Fifth Amendment privilege, however, as Ry-
lander did here, explaining is no longer an option the Government 
reasonably can offer. What had been a reasonable choice becomes, 
with the assertion of the privilege, an impermissible burden. 
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